Statutes of Ill Repose and Threshold Canons of
Construction: A Unified Approach to Ambiguity
After San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States
Daniel Lee*
I. INTRODUCTION
Through East-Central Arizona runs a dying river.1 Diversions have
reduced the river’s flow, and oftentimes, it is completely dry.2 Severe
pollution has rendered the remaining water undrinkable, un-swimmable,
and unsuitable for growing crops.3 Yet parties bitterly dispute who is entitled to this water.4 Copper companies use the water to operate mines,5
while parties situated upstream of the degradation still use the water for
agriculture.6
Historically, the San Carlos Apache Tribe depended on the Gila
River to irrigate crops and sustain a population of around 14,000 tribe
*
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1. GREGORY MCNAMEE, GILA: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AN AMERICAN RIVER 17–18 (1998).
2. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (D. Ariz. 1996), aff’d,
117 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that upper valley water users “on occasion divert the entire
flow of the stream”); Michael C. Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water Rights and
Western Streamflow Restoration in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise Unfulfilled, 36
ENVTL. L. 1157, 1183 (2006) (“due to agricultural and municipal diversions, the river is largely a
trickle”).
3. Arizona Water Settlements Act: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power of
the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources and the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 41, 53
(2003) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Kathleen W. Kitcheyan, Chairwoman, San Carlos Apache
Tribe); see also Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. at 1449–54 (discussing the significant
degradation to the Gila River caused by low flow rate and high level of salinity); MCNAMEE, supra
note 1, at 173–74 (“Manufacturing plants, airports, military installations, and sewage treatment
plants have long disposed of hazardous wastes in the Gila and its tributaries.”).
4. See generally Joseph M. Feller, The Adjudication that Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 405 (2007).
5. PHELPS DODGE CORP., LOACH MINNOW AND SPIKEDACE MANAGEMENT PLAN, UPPER GILA
RIVER, NEW MEXICO 2 (2006), available at http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/arizona/Documents/
SpeciesDocs/SD_LM/PD_mgmt_plan_Gila_8_22_2006.pdf.
6. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 31 F.3d 1428, 1431–32 (9th Cir. 1994).
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members.7 The river is also sacred to the Tribe and central to the Tribe’s
culture and spirituality.8 Initially, the federal government had recognized
the Tribe’s dependence on the Gila River by reserving, under the Winters
doctrine, water rights necessary to support the San Carlos Apache Reservation.9 The Winters doctrine provides that the federal government, when
creating a reservation, impliedly reserves for the tribe an amount of water
sufficient to support the reservation.10 This implied reservation of water
rights is based on an assumption that the government “intended to deal
fairly with the Indians by reserving for them the waters without which
their lands would have been useless.”11
The Winters doctrine has been described as “the government’s
promise, implicit in the establishment of reservations, to make them livable and to enable the tribes to become self sustaining.”12 If the Winters
doctrine is a promise to the tribes, this Note is about a broken promise.13
In the 1920s, in connection with the construction of the Coolidge Dam,
the United States initiated proceedings to clarify water rights for users of
the Gila River.14 Acting as the Tribe’s trustee, the United States entered
into the Globe Equity Decree (the Decree), which prevented the San Carlos Apache Tribe from claiming water rights under the Winters doctrine
and awarded significant water rights to private parties and other Indian
tribes.15
This decree has been the subject of nearly a century of litigation,
including decisions by the Arizona Supreme Court 16 and the U.S. Su7. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman,
J., dissenting); MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 47–48.
8. Hearing, supra note 3, at 41, 53 (statement of Kathleen W. Kitcheyan); MCNAMEE, supra
note 1, at 12–15, 46–51.
9. See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
10. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 116 n.1 (1983).
11. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
12. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.06 (2005 ed.).
13. Sadly, a broken promise is hardly a rare occurrence in the history of Federal Indian Law.
E.g., MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 158 (“Indians have long been used to our trail of broken treaties—
of 370 signed between the 1780s and 1880s, not a single pact between the federal government and
the Indian nations has been preserved in its entirety . . . [A] great many of these broken treaties have
had to do with water.”). Indeed, in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized
Congress’s right to unilaterally abrogate treaties. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903);
see also John P. Lavelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex Parte Young, Expansion
of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur D’alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 787, 789
(1999) (“They made many promises to us, but they only kept one: they promised to take our land,
and they took it.” (quoting REX WEYLER, BLOOD OF THE LAND 65 (1982))).
14. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
15. Id. at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting).
16. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 127 P.3d
882 (Ariz. 2006) [hereinafter Gen. Adjudication].
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preme Court.17 In particular, this Note focuses on the Federal Circuit’s
decision in 2011 that the San Carlos Apache Tribe could not seek damages against the United States for improperly diminishing the Tribe’s
reserved water rights to the Gila River under the Decree because the
court determined that the statute of limitations had run.18 This Note argues that the case was wrongly decided. It then proposes two new analytical devices to overcome the recent trend of courts denying remedies to
tribes based on supposedly unambiguous language of treaties, statutes,
and decrees.
Following this introduction, Part II provides historical and background information about the San Carlos Apache Tribe and the litigation
leading up to the Federal Circuit case, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States. Part III tracks the Federal Circuit’s reasoning that the statute of
limitations had run because the Decree’s plain language was unambiguous and put the tribe on notice of its claim. Part IV critiques that reasoning and shows that the U.S. Supreme Court has been willing to find ambiguity in similar language in the context of Indian reserved rights. Part
V then argues for three more equitable approaches to ambiguity: first,
courts should consider legal ambiguity, not just factual ambiguity, when
determining whether legally operative language puts a tribe on notice
that its claim has accrued; second, courts should take a unified approach
to and treat all-encompassing terms as ambiguous when tribal reserved
rights are at issue; and third, courts can apply threshold canons of construction to determine whether ambiguity is present in the first place and
whether the traditional Indian canons of construction therefore apply.
II. HISTORY OF THE SAN CARLOS RESERVATION AND WATER RIGHTS
LITIGATION
Established in 1872, the San Carlos Apache Reservation is located
along the Gila River in Arizona.19 The early years of the reservation were
characterized by violence and abysmal health conditions. 20 The army,
17. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
18. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1349–50.
19. Id. at 1356.
20. Gen. Adjudication, 127 P.3d at 885. In creating the reservation, the government forcibly
relocated several Apache bands: “[T]he army . . . ferret[ed] out Apaches from their highland camps
and march[ed] them to the reservation. . . . [Those] Apaches who did not comply were gunned down,
the fate of some seventy Yavapai Apache women and children at the so-called Skeleton Cave Massacre of December 1872.” MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 109. In the relocation process, a thousand
Apaches died and a total of six thousand Apaches “were finally herded onto the San Carlos Reservation.” Id. In the early 1900s, the Apaches “continued to die . . . [from] diseases like malaria and
typhus and especially of hunger.” Id. at 112–13; see also JOHN GREGORY BOURKE, ON THE BORDER
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who had forcibly relocated the Apache to the Reservation, referred to it
as “Hell’s Forty Acres.”21 This small amount of land contained several
rival Apache bands.22 It was not until the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 that these bands came together to form a government.23 Today, the
San Carlos Apache Reservation remains one of the poorest reservations,
with a majority of the residents living under the poverty line.24 Unemployment is extremely high—around 68% as of 2005.25
When the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the rationale of the Winters doctrine, it almost seemed to have the San Carlos Apache Reservation in mind. The Court explained that without federal reserved water
rights, Indian reservation lands “would have been useless.” 26 Indeed,
without water for irrigation, the arid climate of the San Carlos Apache
Reservation would have made development of agriculture difficult, if not
impossible. When describing the reservation, one army officer commented that “[r]ain is so infrequent that it took on the semblance of a phenomenon when it came at all. Almost continuously dry, hot, dust- and
gravel-laden winds swept the plain, denuding it of every vestige of vegetation. In summer a temperature of 110 in the shade was cool weather.”27
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the United States further exacerbated the impact of these conditions on the tribes located there by destroying and selling the most valuable irrigable lands on the reserva-

WITH CROOK 129 (1971) (“Our government had never been able to starve any of them until it had
them placed on a reservation.”). Government pollution of the Gila River has also contributed to the
significant health problems on the reservation:
[T]he Bureau of Indian Affairs routinely dumped electrical transformers containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) alongside reservoirs and cattle tanks on the San Carlos
Reservation, where the streamside soil had long been contaminated by previous diesel
fuel dumping. It will cost taxpayers at least $4 million to remove these carcinogenic materials from the soil. In the meanwhile, Apaches are again dying at the hands of the
American government.
MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 173–74.
21. Id. at 109.
22. CLARE VERNON MCKANNA, WHITE JUSTICE IN ARIZONA: APACHE MURDER TRIALS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 105 (2005); see also THOMAS EDWIN FARISH, 7 HISTORY OF ARIZONA, 1–18
(1918), available at http://southwest.library.arizona.edu/hav7/index.html.
23. See Corporate Charter of the San Carlos Apache Tribe Arizona, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (Oct. 16, 1940), http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/sancarchrtr.html.
24. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INDIAN SERVS.,
AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE REPORT 36 (2005), available at
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-001719.pdf.
25. Id.
26. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
27. RICHARD J. PERRY, APACHE RESERVATION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE AMERICAN
STATE 120 (1993).
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tion.28 The sales decreased the reservation’s size five times, and the settlers who purchased these lands then began to divert water from the Gila
River.29 Despite the Tribe’s objections,30 the United States then flooded
22,000 acres of the most valuable remaining reservation lands when the
United States began construction on the Coolidge Dam on the Gila River.31 When the dam was complete, the flooding caused a “temporary famine” throughout the Apache nation.32
A. The Coolidge Dam and the Globe Equity Decree
In connection with the construction of the Coolidge Dam, the government filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona in 1925 to obtain a decree regarding water rights to the Gila
River.33 The Tribe did not participate in the negotiations and was not a
party to the proceeding.34 Instead, the United States used its power to
represent the Tribe as its trustee and settle the Tribe’s water rights.35 Despite its fiduciary obligations as the Tribe’s trustee, the United States
ignored the protests of the Superintendent of the San Carlos Agency,
28. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman,
J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. PAUL & KATHLEEN NICKENS, IMAGES OF AMERICA: OLD SAN CARLOS 117 (2008).
31. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting).
32. MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 150–51. Besides the reservation farmland, the lake also submerged “tribal cemeteries, graves, and archaeology sites that contain and protect human remains,
private homes, a grain mill, and other historical sites, many of which have significant spiritual and
cultural meaning to the . . . Tribe.” Timothy J. Famulare, Note, Has Sandoval Doomed the Private
Right of Action Under the National Historic Preservation Act?, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73, 77 (2006)
(quoting San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (D. Ariz. 2003), aff’d,
417 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2005)). In response to the Tribe’s protest against flooding the burial
grounds, the government proposed to disinter the bodies. FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT, ARIZONA, THE
GRAND CANYON STATE: A STATE GUIDE 14 (1966). But the tribe vehemently objected to this as a
desecration of the dead. Id. Ultimately, the Tribe assented to the government’s placing a concrete
slab over the burial ground. Id. Later, the government’s release of water from the reservoir threatened to expose these graves and damage the burial ground. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 272 F. Supp.
2d at 889. The Tribe sued under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA) and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) to enjoin the government from
releasing the water and exposing the graves. Id. at 867. But the district court dismissed the Tribe’s
case and concluded that the Tribe could not bring its NAGPRA claim until the release of water actually caused the disinterment of human remains. Id. at 889. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit split with the
Third and Fifth circuits and held that the NHPA did not give the Tribe a private cause of action. San
Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 F.3d 1091, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the court denied the Tribe’s claim. Id.
33. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1348.
34. Id. at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in
Gila River Sys. & Source, 127 P.3d 882, 896 (Ariz. 2006).
35. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1348.
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who opposed the Decree because of the adverse impact it would have on
the Tribe.36 Some federal officials, including the Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, even stated that the United States should not support
the Tribe’s superior priority to the waters of the Gila River.37
In 1935, the court approved a settlement known as the Globe Equity
Decree, which granted merely 6,000 acre-feet of water38 from the Gila
River each year to the Apache Tribe for irrigation.39 The court rationalized this low award by stating that “the Apache are and always have been
warlike and in no sense agrarian.”40 In contrast, the Pima Tribe, located
on the nearby Gila Indian Reservation, received over 210,000 acre-feet
of water per year because they “are an industrious farming race.”41 NonIndian interests received 350,000 acre-feet of annual irrigation water.42
Although the reservoir and dam are located on the Apache reservation,43 the Tribe received no water storage rights for the impounded waters, which were instead apportioned to other water users.44 Further, the
Decree stated that the parties “concluded and settled all issues” regarding
water rights to the Gila River and that “all of the parties . . . are hereby
forever enjoined and restrained from asserting or claiming—as against
any of the parties herein . . . any right, title or interest in or to the waters
of the Gila River . . . except the rights specified, determined and allowed
by this decree.”45
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Determines that a State Court Could Decide
the Tribe’s Rights Despite Tribal Sovereign Immunity
In 1974, private water users petitioned the Arizona state courts to
adjudicate the water rights to the Gila River.46 The immense proceeding
that followed, the Gila River Water Adjudication, is the largest and long36. Id. at 1356.
37. Id.
38. One acre-foot of water is “enough to cover an acre of land with one foot of water.” Arizona
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 557 n.22 (1963).
39. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1351.
40. Id. at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Famulare, supra note 32, at 77.
44. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 31 F.3d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Water
can be released from the Reservoir only to the GRIC [Gila River Indian Community] and the SCIDD
[San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District], not for use by the Apache Tribe.”); San Carlos Apache
Tribe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 870 (D. Ariz. 2003), aff’d, 417 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2005) (“[N]either the Apache Tribe, the San Carlos Apache Indian Reservation, nor any individual
Apache Indians have any right to store water in the [Lake].”).
45. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
46. Feller, supra note 4, at 417.

2013]

Statutes of Ill Repose

2003

est judicial proceeding in the history of Arizona.47 The goal of the adjudication was to “determine the quantities and relative priorities of all legal rights to the use of water from the Gila River and its tributaries within Arizona.”48 Over 849,000 parties received summons by mail, 24,000
of which became parties to the adjudication.49 Although the San Carlos
Apache Tribe was not directly served with process, the state courts still
sought to bind the Tribe to the adjudication by joining the United States
as the Tribe’s trustee.50
To avoid this, the Tribe sought removal of the state proceedings to
the U.S. District Court and injunctive relief preventing adjudication of its
rights in state court.51 But the district court dismissed the case.52 On review, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the “District Court[] [was] correct in deferring to the state proceedings”53 because the state courts had
jurisdiction to decide the tribes’ water rights under the McCarran
Amendment.54
The McCarran Amendment waived the sovereign immunity of the
United States and permitted state courts to adjudicate water rights held
by the United States when the state court engages in a comprehensive
water adjudication.55 Although the McCarran Amendment did not refer
to Indian water rights or waive tribal sovereign immunity, the Court nevertheless interpreted the Amendment to “provide[] state courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights held in trust by the United
States.”56 The Court acknowledged that Indian rights are usually immune
from state court interference because state courts are notoriously hostile

47. Id. at 406.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 407.
50. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 558 (1983).
51. Id. Other tribes pursued these remedies as well. Id. The tribes also sought an independent
federal determination of its water rights and a declaration that the state could not decide the tribes’
rights. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 570. The Court stated that the district court was correct in deferring to state proceedings “assuming that the state adjudications are adequate to quantify the rights at issue in the federal
suits.” Id. The Court remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 571.
54. Id. at 570. The McCarran Amendment states, in relevant part:
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the
administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is
in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by
exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit.
43 U.S.C. § 666 (2011).
55. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 548–49.
56. Id. at 549 (citing Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)).
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to Indian rights. 57 The Court also recognized that allowing state court
adjudication of Indian water rights would effectively abrogate tribal sovereignty by forcing tribes to defend their rights in state court.58 Nevertheless, the Court placed the policy of efficiency and avoidance of duplicative litigation above these concerns.59 It concluded that the Indian water
rights should be decided in state court because adjudication of these
rights in federal court would duplicate some of the work in the state adjudication.60
C. The Arizona Supreme Court Determines that the Tribe’s Water Rights
Were Diminished
After the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal
of the case, the San Carlos Apache Tribe was forced to enter the general
adjudication in state court to defend its rights.61 In the state adjudication,
other tribes, copper companies, and municipalities sought to bind the
Tribe to the Globe Equity Decree and prevent the Tribe from asserting its
Winters water rights that the Decree had allegedly abrogated.62 The Tribe
argued that it should not be bound to the Decree under the doctrine of res
judicata.63 Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party is only bound by an
earlier decree if it was adequately represented by a party to the decree.64
57. Id. at 566–67. The Tribe made the following arguments:
(1) Indian rights have traditionally been left free of interference from the States. (2) State
courts may be inhospitable to Indian rights. (3) The McCarran Amendment, although it
waived United States sovereign immunity in state comprehensive water adjudications,
did not waive Indian sovereign immunity. It is therefore unfair to force Indian claimants
to choose between waiving their sovereign immunity by intervening in the state proceedings and relying on the United States to represent their interests in state court, particularly
in light of the frequent conflict of interest between Indian claims and other federal interests and the right of the Indians under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 to bring suit on their own behalf
in federal court. (4) Indian water rights claims are generally based on federal rather than
state law. (5) Because Indian water claims are based on the doctrine of “reserved rights,”
and take priority over most water rights created by state law, they need not as a practical
matter be adjudicated inter sese with other water rights, and could simply be incorporated
into the comprehensive state decree at the conclusion of the state proceedings.
Id. The Court acknowledged that “[e]ach of these arguments has a good deal of force.” Id. at 567.
58. Id. at 578 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“If federal courts defer to state court proceedings,
then the Indian tribes will be unable to represent themselves without waiving tribal sovereign immunity from state court jurisdiction.”).
59. See id. at 567.
60. Id.
61. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman,
J., Dissenting).
62. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 127 P.3d
882, 886 (Ariz. 2006).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).
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Thus, the Tribe argued that the United States failed to adequately represent the Tribe when it entered into the Globe Equity Decree on the
Tribe’s behalf. 65 Indeed, the United States had significant conflicts of
interest in representing the Tribe along with other parties that directly
opposed the Tribe’s rights.66
Nevertheless, the Arizona court determined that res judicata applied
and that the Decree precluded the Tribe from asserting claims for federal
reserved water rights.67 First, the Arizona court determined that the scope
of the Decree was broad enough to address the Tribe’s Winters water
rights and not just the Tribe’s beneficial use water rights under state
law.68 The Arizona court reached this conclusion even though the Decree
did not specifically refer to federal reserved water rights or the Winters
doctrine, and even though the United States had only explicitly asserted
water rights under the theory of prior appropriation in the proceedings to
the Decree.69
Second, the court determined that the Tribe was bound to the Decree under the doctrine of res judicata.70 To reach this result, the court
“decline[d] to consider” the Tribe’s arguments because by purporting to
give comity to the federal court that issued the Decree.71 Although the
federal court that issued the Decree had already declined jurisdiction and
thus passed on deciding the issue,72 the Arizona court nevertheless extrapolated, based on the federal court’s treatment of other opposing
tribes’ claims for water, how the federal court would have decided the
San Carlos Apache Tribe’s res judicata defense. 73 Thus, the Arizona
court bound the Tribe to the Decree, effectively diminishing the Tribe’s
substantial Winters water rights to the 6,000 gallons per day (gpd) limit
in the Decree.74
Although the Arizona court concluded that the Tribe could not
claim federal reserved water rights under the Globe Equity Decree, the
65. Gen. Adjudication, 127 P.3d at 897.
66. See id. at 897.
67. Id. at 903.
68. Id. at 892–94.
69. See id. at 888. While the Winters doctrine is a federal doctrine, prior appropriation is a state
water law system that is used to determine the superiority of one water right vis-à-vis another. Under
the prior appropriation system, water rights are prioritized based on the time when the diversion
began. A senior water user therefore has a right to use water before a junior water user.
70. Id. at 895–903.
71. Id. at 901.
72. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court affirming the district court’s refusal to
hear the Tribe’s case in federal court).
73. Gen. Adjudication, 127 P.3d at 900–01.
74. Id. at 895–903.
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court also implied that the Tribe might have remedies against the United
States for improperly settling the Tribe’s water rights.75 Acting on this,
the Tribe sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims for
breach of fiduciary duty. 76 But the claims court dismissed the Tribe’s
case based on the statute of limitations. 77 In the latest chapter on the
Tribe’s water rights, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal in San
Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States.78
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S REASONING
The Federal Circuit dismissed the Tribe’s claim for damages
against the United States because it determined that the statute of limitations had run.79 Under the Tucker Act, a tribe’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty is time-barred unless the claim is “filed within six years after
such claim first accrues.”80 A claim “first accrues” “when all the events
which fix the government’s alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence.”81
The court determined that the Tribe should have been aware that the
events leading to the government’s liability had occurred upon the issuance of the Globe Equity Decree in 1935.82 The court rationalized this
conclusion by (1) concluding that the plain language of the Decree would
have put the tribes on notice of the events giving rise to liability, thus
causing the claim to accrue; and (2) analogizing the case to Catawba,
where a tribe’s claim was time-barred, while distinguishing Samish,
where the statute of limitations did not prevent the tribe’s claim.
A. Plain Language
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the Tribe’s claim had in fact accrued in 1935 upon the entering of the Decree, not in 2006 upon the Arizona court’s decision.83 The Federal Circuit explained that “whether the
pertinent events have occurred [for a claim to accrue] is determined under an objective standard; a plaintiff does not have to possess actual
knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to ac75. See id. at 901 n.21.
76. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1348.
79. Id. at 1349 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2004)).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2004).
81. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1350 (citing Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted)).
82. Id. at 1351.
83. Id.
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crue.”84 According to the Federal Circuit, the Tribe should have known
of all of the events leading to government’s liability in 1935 by the plain
language of the Decree. 85 According to the court, the Decree’s terms
“plainly and objectively indicate which water rights the Tribe did and,
importantly, did not receive following the settlement of the Globe Equity
Litigation”:86
The Decree does not expressly grant any aboriginal or federal reserved water rights to the Tribe, and, as the Tribe acknowledges, the
Decree plainly identifies the Tribe as represented by the United
States in the Globe Equity Litigation, grants the Tribe a total of
6,000 acre feet of water rights, and includes a provision in Article
XIII stating that “each and all of the parties to whom rights to water
are decreed in this cause . . . are hereby forever enjoined and restrained from asserting or claiming . . . any right, title or interest in
or to the waters of the Gila River, or any thereof, except the rights
specified, determined and allowed by this decree.87

Thus, the court determined that the Tribe “knew or should have known
that the terms of the Decree precluded the Tribe from seeking additional
Gila River water rights” 88 and that its Winters water rights had been
abridged.89 Finally, the court reasoned that because the Decree “plainly
indicated that the United States represented multiple parties in the Globe
Equity Litigation,” the Tribe should have known of the facts showing the
United States’ conflict of interest at the time the Decree was issued.90
B. Analogizing Catawba, Distinguishing Samish
The San Carlon Apache Tribe court bolstered its plain language argument by analogizing the case to Catawba Indian Tribe v. United
States.91 In that case, the Catawba Tribe sued the United States in 1990
for breach of fiduciary duty. The United States had failed to notify the
Tribe as its counsel that the Tribe’s land was subject to state adverse possession laws after the federal Termination Act became effective in
1962.92 Just four years before Catawba, the U.S. Supreme Court had de-

84. Id. at 1350 (citing Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
85. Id. at 1350–51.
86. Id. at 1351.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1353.
90. Id. at 1351.
91. Id. at 1353.
92. Catawba Indian Tribe v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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termined that the Termination Act subjected tribal lands to state adverse
possession laws.93
The Catawba Tribe argued that its claim had not accrued until the
Supreme Court’s 1986 determination that state adverse possession laws
applied.94 The Catawba court disagreed: it concluded that the statute of
limitations began to run earlier, when the adverse possession laws were
first made applicable to the tribal land in 1962, after Congress terminated
the Tribe’s official status as a federally recognized tribe.95 The court reasoned that the Catawba Tribe had notice of its claim before the Supreme
Court’s 1986 decision because the language of the earlier Termination
Act was unambiguous in subjecting the land to adverse possession.96 According to the Catawba court, the Supreme Court’s later decision merely
recognized the meaning of the Act’s plain language, but was not a condition precedent to the claim’s accrual.97
In contrast, in Samish Indian Nation v. United States,98 the Samish
Tribe was not time-barred from bringing its claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. In 1969, the Department of the Interior had removed the Samish
Tribe from the list of federally recognized tribes. 99 The Samish Tribe
then sought recognition and obtained relief: a federal district court ruled
in 1996 that the federal government’s refusal to recognize the Samish
violated the Tribe’s due process rights.100 In 2002, the Samish sued for
monetary damages resulting from the government’s wrongful refusal to
recognize the Tribe between 1969 and 1996.101
The Federal Circuit determined that the claim was not barred by the
statute of limitations. 102 The Samish court explained that “the district
court’s determination [in 1996] provides a predicate ‘wrongful’ element
in this action.”103 Because the district court was the only authority that
could review the recognition determination,104 its decision in 1996 was a
“missing element,” without which the Samish’s claim for damages would
not have accrued.105 Because the claim in 2002 was brought within six
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1570–71.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1570.
98. 419 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
99. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
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years of the claim’s accrual in 1996, the complaint was timely.106 The
Samish court stated, “If a necessary element to a claim must be established in a different forum, the claim will not accrue . . . until that element is finally established in the other proceeding.”107
The San Carlos Apache Tribe relied on Samish to argue that its
claim did not accrue until 2006, when the Arizona Supreme Court decided a “necessary element” of the claim: “that the Tribe was precluded
from asserting its Winters and aboriginal water rights to the main stem of
the Gila River.”108 Without the Arizona court’s legal determination that
the Tribe was bound to the Decree and that the Decree covered the
Tribe’s Winters rights, the Tribe would have experienced no harm from
the United States’ inadequate representation of the Tribe during the
Globe Equity proceedings. Thus, without the Arizona court’s determination, a necessary element of the claim would have been lacking: the element of harm.
Because the San Carlos Apache Tribe’s claim was brought within
six years of the Arizona court’s legal determination of the Decree’s
scope and effect, it should not have been time-barred. Nevertheless, the
Federal Circuit distinguished Samish. It reasoned that the district court’s
determination in Samish—that federal recognition of the tribe was improperly withheld—was necessary for the damages claim in that case,
but that the Arizona court’s determination was not necessary to the San
Carlos Apache Tribe’s claim because “the Tribe’s claim required no further legal determination beyond the Decree itself.”109 According to the
Federal Circuit, the Arizona court had not provided a missing element to
the Tribe’s claim because the Arizona court had “simply stated what was
readily apparent from the face of the 1935 Decree.”110
While distinguishing Samish, the San Carlos court analogized Catawba by characterizing the Globe Equity Decree as “unambiguous” just
like the Termination Act in Catawba.111 Just as the Supreme Court had
relied on the plain language of the Termination Act in the Catawba case,
the Arizona court had relied on the supposedly unambiguous Decree in
determining that the Tribe’s property rights had been abridged.112 Thus,
the Federal Circuit determined that the San Carlos Apache Tribe’s claims
had accrued in 1935, when the Globe Equity Decree was issued.
106. Id.
107. Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
108. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1352–53 (quoting Appellant Brief at 27).
109. Id. at 1353.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1354.
112. See id.
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IV. THREE CRITIQUES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The Federal Circuit erred when it affirmed the Court of Claims’
dismissal of the San Carlos Apache Tribe’s suit for three reasons. Section
A explores the Federal Circuit’s implicit, unfounded assumption that the
Tribe should have been aware of the terms of the Globe Equity Decree.
Section B then examines how the Federal Circuit’s opinion effectively
requires preemptive litigation, which in turn clogs the court system with
claims that would not be considered ripe. Section C then shows how the
Federal Circuit improperly deferred to the Arizona state court’s determination on the plain language of the Decree.
A. A Catch 22 and an Unfounded Assumption
In bringing its complaint, the Tribe was in the unfortunate situation
of having to choose between a strong case on the merits of its claim for
damages or a strong case on the statute of limitations issue. Proof that the
Tribe offered showing that the government breached its fiduciary duty
would also tend to show that this breach should have been apparent to
the Tribe and that the Tribe should have been on notice that the claim
had already accrued. In other words, if the Tribe made a strong showing
on the merits, it would undermine its defense on the statute of limitations
issue by showing that the claim was strong enough that a reasonable
claimant would have noticed it.113
Indeed, the Federal Circuit used several of the arguments on the
merits from the Tribe’s complaint against the Tribe when deciding the
statute of limitations issue.114 For example, because the complaint recognized that the Decree allotted only 6,000 acre-feet of water to the Tribe,
the court concluded that the Tribe knew or should have known that the
plain terms of the Decree diminished the Tribe’s Winters water rights.115
Similarly, in its complaint, the Tribe argued that the government’s reservation of substantial water rights for other parties under the Decree, in
contrast to the negligible water rights reserved to the San Carlos Apache
Tribe, demonstrated that the United States’ representation of the Tribe
was inadequate. 116 But the court again countered that the contrast between the water rights reserved under the Decree also showed that the

113. See, e.g., Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“[I]f a plaintiff pleads facts that show its suit barred by a statute of limitations, it may plead itself
out of court under a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.”).
114. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1352.
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Tribe should have known that the claim had accrued at the time of the
Decree.117
The Federal Circuit’s clever manipulation of the Tribe’s arguments
all rest on the frail assumption that the Tribe would have at least known
the terms of the Decree in 1935. Even if the Tribe had a strong case in
1935 based only on clear language of the Decree, it still would have had
to have notice of the terms of the Decree to be held accountable for
knowledge of its legal effect. But no reasonable plaintiff should be expected to bring suit over a dealing purportedly on its behalf, when it was
not a party to the deal and all of the parties to the deal had an incentive to
hide it from the plaintiff.
That was exactly the case for the San Carlos Apache Tribe: the
Tribe was not a party to the Decree, so it did not have notice of the Decree’s terms through the Globe Equity proceedings. Further, the nature of
the Tribe’s allegation—that the United States breached its fiduciary duty
and had a conflict of interest—itself indicates that the Tribe would have
been unlikely to gain knowledge of the terms of the Decree. A fiduciary
that breaches its duty has an incentive to keep that breach unknown to
the harmed party. Indeed, the government continually maintained to the
Tribe and to courts that the Decree did not address the Tribe’s federally
reserved rights.118
The court’s assumption also fails to account for the actual situation
of the Tribe at the time of the Globe Equity proceedings and the unlikelihood that a Tribe in such a situation would have been able to meaningfully obtain notice of the Decree’s terms. At the time that the court entered into the Decree, the San Carlos Apache Tribe was a conglomerate
of several different tribes that were each in tension.119 It was not until
nearly a decade after the Decree was issued that the bands nominally cre117. Id. The court eagerly used the Tribe’s arguments against the Tribe, but the court did not
appreciate how its own arguments proved the flaws in the Arizona court’s reasoning that the Decree
bound the Tribe. The Federal Circuit’s determination that the Decree unambiguously diminished the
Tribe’s water rights supports the finding that the government’s representation of the Tribe was inadequate and that the Tribe should not have been bound to the Decree. If the Decree unambiguously
diminished the Tribe’s water rights such that the Tribe should have been on notice of its claim for
breach of fiduciary duty, then the Decree also unambiguously indicated that the government’s representation of the Tribe was inadequate and that the Tribe therefore should not be bound to the Decree.
Because the Arizona court bound the Tribe to the Decree despite this inadequate representation, it
abridged the Tribe’s due process rights. Thus, the Federal Circuit could not reach its result regarding
the statute of limitations without showing the flaw in the Arizona court’s reasoning. Although the
Federal Circuit sought to defer to the Arizona court decision, the Federal Circuit could not avoid the
logical implications of its ruling—that the Arizona court was wrong.
118. Id. at 1351.
119. See MCKANNA, supra note 22, at 105; MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 47 (“[T]he Apaches
were loosely anarchic, bound by clan rather than political ties.”).
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ated a government to satisfy the terms of the Indian Reorganization
Act.120 Before then, the Tribe had been described as a “broken nation,”
suffering from inter-tribal violence, oppression from the U.S. military,
and rampant disease outbreaks.121 In such a condition, it is unlikely that
the Tribe could have had meaningful notice of the legal terms of the Decree when it was entered into.
Finally, holding the Tribe to objective knowledge of the United
States’ breach of fiduciary duty would effectively require the Tribe to
constantly scrutinize the unilateral legal doings of the United States as its
trustee during a time when the Tribe was politically incapable of doing
so. In Mitchell II, the Supreme Court rejected an approach to the trust
duty that would have similarly required a tribe to continually scrutinize
the actions of the United States as its trustee.122 The Court stated that the
Indians in that case were “in no position to monitor federal management
of their lands on a consistent basis” because, among other reasons,
“[m]any are poorly educated.”123 The Court concluded that “it was the
very recognition of the inability of the Indians to oversee their interests
that led to federal management in the first place.”124 Therefore, a “trusteeship would mean little if the beneficiaries were required to supervise
the day-to-day management of their estate by their trustee or else be precluded from recovery for mismanagement.”125
Although Mitchell II did not concern a statute of limitations issue,126 the Court’s analysis in that case suggests that a tribe should not be
held accountable for knowledge of the United States’ breach of its fiduciary duty if the tribe was poorly equipped to learn of the breach. In other
words, Mitchell II suggests a more nuanced approach to the notice requirement and a contextualization of the objective standard. Under a
purely objective standard, a beneficiary might always be held accountable for knowing the terms of a contract concerning the property of the
beneficiary. But under a more contextualized approach that reflects the
considerations in Mitchell II, such knowledge should not be presumed if
the tribe was unable to monitor the acts of the United States as its trustee.

120. See Corporate Charter of the San Carlos Apache Tribe Arizona, supra note 23.
121. MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 112.
122. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 227 (1983).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The main issue before the Court was whether a tribe who had been harmed by the
U.S.’s breach of fiduciary duty was relegated to only prospective remedies, or whether the tribe
could obtain monetary damages. Id.
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B. Requiring Preemptive Litigation
Because the Federal Circuit determined that the Tribe’s claim accrued in 1935 upon entering of the Globe Equity Decree,127 the Tribe
would have had to sue the United States by 1941 to meet the statute of
limitations.128 At that time, the Tribe had not yet been held bound to the
Decree, and therefore had experienced no harm. 129 In effect, the court
required the Tribe to litigate its claim preemptively, before it was
harmed.
To justify this unlikely result, the court first emphasized that a
plaintiff need not have knowledge of the “full extent of the damage” for
the claim to accrue.130 This argument distorted the Tribe’s situation prior
to 2006 by implying that the Tribe at least knew that some damage had
occurred, but merely did not know the extent of the damage. In fact, the
Tribe did not know whether any damage occurred in 1941 because no
court had determined that the Tribe, as a nonparty, was bound to the Decree. It was not until the 2006 Arizona court case that the Tribe was first
bound to the Decree.131 Therefore, the Tribe did not know whether the
Decree caused any harm until 2006.
The court avoided addressing this lack of harm prior to 2006 by
avoiding ripeness analysis. Although the court briefly acknowledged the
Tribe’s argument that the claim was not ripe,132 the court did not address
or refute the argument. Avoiding the issue was likely strategic: had the
court determined that the claim was not ripe before the 2006 decision, it
would have been forced to find that the statute of limitations had not yet

127. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
128. Id. at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting). Actually, because the Tucker Act did not allow
Indian suits against the government, the Tribe could not have sued in 1941. It was not until the passage of the Indian Tucker Act in 1946 that tribes were permitted to sue the government. In recognition of this, for five years after the passage of the Indian Tucker Act, the government permitted
tribes to bring claims that had accrued before the passage of the Indian Tucker Act. Steven Paul
McSloy, Revisiting the “Courts of the Conqueror”: American Indian Claims Against the United
States, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 537, 547–48 (1994).
129. See San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1354 (majority opinion).
131. Although the parties generally assume that the Tribe is bound to the Decree under the
Arizona judgment, and this paper generally interprets the Arizona opinion accordingly, it is arguably
questionable whether the Tribe is actually bound to the Decree under the Arizona court decision
because the Arizona court did not fully decide the res judicata issue. In declining to decide an element of res judicata, the court arguably declined to decide the overall issue, deferring instead to the
district court.
132. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1349.
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run because “a cause of action accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations ‘when it is sufficiently ripe.’”133
For a claim to be ripe, the damage must be “quantifiable and present,” not “speculative.”134 At least “some damage” must be shown.135
Prior to the 2006 decision, the Tribe could not have proven any damage
because no court had determined that its federal reserved water rights
were lost under the Decree. Granted, the Tribe’s hypothetical damage
would have been “quantifiable” before 2006 because a court could have
determined the value of the federal reserved water rights the Tribe might
lose under the Decree. Nevertheless, this damage was “speculative,” not
“present.” Indeed, the government’s longstanding position, that the Tribe
had retained its reserved water rights under the Decree,136 confirms that
damage was only speculative until 2006. By avoiding the issue of ripeness, the court sidestepped the Tribe’s arguments that the its claim had
not accrued because no damage had occurred before the 2006 decision.
C. Improper Deference to the Arizona Court
To support its conclusion that the plain language of the Decree notified the Tribe that its Winters rights were diminished, the Federal Circuit
referenced the Arizona court’s determination that the Decree’s language
was unambiguous.137 The Federal Circuit stated that the Arizona court’s
determination “foreshadow[ed] our present decision.” 138 But the court
did not just cite the Arizona court’s determination to reinforce its decision. Rather, it relied on the Arizona court’s determination that the language was unambiguous to support one of its key arguments: that the
case was analogous to Catawba.139

133. Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 194 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Whittle v. Local 641, Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 56 F.3d 487, 489 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at
1361 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“‘Starting the statute of limitations clock’ occurs when the ‘claim
become[s] ripe for adjudication.’” (quoting Bayou Des Familles Dev. Corp. v. United States, 130
F.3d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).
134. Nw. La. Fish & Game Pres. Comm’n v. United States, 446 F.3d 1285, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
135. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 433 (Fed. Cl. 2011), aff’d, 708
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cl. 2013); Cloutier v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 326, 330 (1990), aff’d, 937 F.2d 622
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Without proof that some damage has already occurred, plaintiffs’ claim of a taking is simply not ripe for a decision.”).
136. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1350.
137. Id. at 1354.
138. Id.
139. Id. (“[L]ike the Supreme Court in Catawba, the Arizona Supreme Court based its decision
on the unambiguous language of the legal instrument fixing the alleged liability—the 1935 Decree.”).
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The Catawba court concluded that a tribe’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty was time-barred. Prior to the case, the Supreme Court had
determined that the language of a statute was unambiguous and that the
statute permitted adverse possession claims to the Tribe’s land.140 The
United States, as the Tribe’s trustee, had previously maintained to the
Tribe, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, that the statute did
not permit adverse possession claims against the Tribe’s land.141 Accordingly, the Tribe sued the United States for breach of fiduciary duty.142
The court determined that the unambiguous language of the statute
put the Tribe on notice that its lands were susceptible to adverse possession claims.143 Thus, the statute of limitations on the breach of fiduciary
duty claim began to run when the statute became operative, not when the
Supreme Court made its determination regarding the effect of the language. 144 The Catawba court emphasized that the Supreme Court had
determined that the statute’s language was unambiguous, which showed
that the language of the statute gave the Tribe notice that it had been
harmed, making the claim accrue upon passage of the Act.145
The San Carlos Apache Tribe Court analogized the Arizona court’s
determination that the Globe Equity Decree was unambiguous to the Supreme Court’s determination in Catawba that the statute permitting adverse possession was unambiguous.146 But the Arizona court’s determination was not worthy of the same deference as the Supreme Court’s decision in Catawba.147 Not only did the Arizona court fail to consider federal court precedent in determining whether ambiguity existed, it also
ignored discrepancies in the timing of the reservations of water rights
and the priority dates in the Decree, which indicated that the Decree did
not address the Tribe’s reserved rights.148 Finally, the Arizona court de-

140. Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564, 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
141. Id. at 1568.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1570–71.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1570.
146. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As the
dissent pointed out, the Catawba case was “too remote, in fact and law, to govern this case.” Id. at
1359 (Newman, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished the facts in Catawba, noting that “[i]n
Catawba the United States refused to recognize the lands as belonging to the Tribe, whereas for the
San Carlos water rights the United States supported the Tribe’s claim, and the water rights issue was
acknowledged by the Supreme Court to be unresolved when the issue was consigned to the Arizona
courts for resolution.” Id.
147. See discussion supra Part II.C.
148. See discussion supra Part II.C.

2016

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:1997

termined that no ambiguity existed even when the Decree failed to explicitly mention federal reserved water rights.149
Moreover, in Catawba, the Supreme Court’s decision was not only
binding on the Catawba court, it was also credible and authoritative because the Supreme Court had final appellate review over matters of federal law and Indian law. In contrast, the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of a federal decree on a matter of federal Indian law could not
be seen as credible or authoritative. In the 1983 case, Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, where the U.S. Supreme Court had initially allowed
state courts to hear the case, the Court acknowledged the bias of state
courts.150 In the same case, the Court had also stated that state court cases
“alleged to abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law can expect to receive . . . particularized and exacting scrutiny.”151 The Federal
Circuit’s passive acceptance of the Arizona court’s determination can
hardly be considered “exacting scrutiny.”152
V. HOW STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS CAN BE EQUITABLY
REINTERPRETED
At the heart of the San Carlos Apache Tribe case is the issue of
how a court should determine whether a text is ambiguous such that it
fails to put a tribe on notice of its claim and thus fails to cause the statute
of limitations to run. In light of the result in San Carlos Apache Tribe,
this Part argues for courts to adopt two approaches to ambiguity in federal Indian law cases concerning statutes of limitations. Section A argues
that legal ambiguity, not just factual ambiguity, should be considered in
determining whether a tribe had notice of its claim such that the statute
of limitations began to run. Section B argues for courts to apply threshold canons of construction to determine whether ambiguity is present in
text such that regular canons of construction would apply. It also proposes that courts take a unified approach to ambiguity according to Supreme

149. See discussion supra Part II.C.
150. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 566–67 (1983). The Court
acknowledged that “Indian rights have traditionally been left free of interference from the States”
and “State courts may be inhospitable to Indian rights.” Id. at 566. The court stated that these arguments had “a good deal of force.” Id. at 567.
151. Id. at 571.
152. Even if the Supreme Court’s “exacting scrutiny” had only been referring to its appellate
review power over state court decisions, the Federal Circuit still should have been cautious to blindly
adopt the Arizona court’s analysis because the Supreme Court’s appellate power is hardly adequate
to control such state bias considering the small number of cases the Supreme Court hears each session.

2013]

Statutes of Ill Repose

2017

Court precedent providing that broad language does not necessarily encompass specific, unmentioned, reserved rights of tribes.153
A. Tolling Statutes of Limitations for Legal Ambiguity
The Federal Circuit concluded that the statute of limitations began
to run in 1935 because it determined that the plain language of the Decree gave the Tribe notice that the settlement would diminish its federal
reserved rights.154 The court did not address whether the Tribe should
have known that the Decree was binding and enforceable probably because courts had already established that the statute of limitations “is not
tolled by the Indians’ ignorance of their legal rights.”155 Rather, courts
are only concerned with whether the Tribe was aware of the facts giving
rise to these legal rights.156
The San Carlos Apache Tribe’s situation exposes the inadequacy of
a rule that fails to account for tribes’ objective knowledge of their legal
rights. First, the long history of litigation surrounding the Tribe’s rights
shows that the current rule is incorrectly framed. In an almost accusatory
manner, the courts frame the rule in terms of tribes’ “ignorance” of the
law.157 But courts have used this justification even after cases have gone
153. Although not fully explored here, at least two other prescriptive elements could be used to
prevent a result like that in San Carlos Apache Tribe from recurring. First, courts could place the
burden of proving that text is unambiguous on the party asserting a diminishment or abrogation of
tribal rights. Second, courts could reinterpret statutes of limitation in order to analyze the policies
behind those statutes. Generally, statutes of limitation provide some measure of repose for all parties
because litigation can no longer be threatened. Arguably, the policy of repose is nothing more than a
recognition of the growing expectation interests of parties that have continued to assume that the
status quo will remain. Thus, even when a party initially gained a certain advantage through wrongdoing, that party’s expectation interests may eventually become strong enough to outweigh the interest of the plaintiff in reversing the wrongdoer’s actions. Recently, however, Professor Ann Tweedy
has questioned whether reliance interests should be invoked when the interests are based on unjustified expectations. See Ann Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the Ghosts of Allotment-Era Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129 (2012). For example, a settler that encouraged the
unlawful seizure of tribal lands should not be able to assert that he has an expectation interest in
maintaining the lands after longstanding investments in the seized lands. This is so regardless of
however far into the future the claim is brought. Although Professor Tweedy makes this argument in
the context of allotments, the argument applies to statutes of limitation as well. If the original party
has no justifiable claim to repose because of willing complicity in the deprivation of a tribe’s property, why should that party’s reliance interests then be protected in a later proceeding even when the
statute of limitations has run? Further, if the status quo prevents the wronged party’s repose because
of a continuing harm, is the wrongdoer nevertheless entitled to repose? These musings end up in a
philosophical debate on the value of statutes of limitations in general. Thus, this Note merely asks
these questions, not rhetorically, but perhaps to inspire future analysis.
154. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
155. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 726 F.2d 718, 720–21 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
156. See id.
157. See, e.g., id.
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all the way to the Supreme Court for a definitive interpretation of law
that is widely disputed.158 Indeed, the San Carlos Apache Tribe’s case
reached the Arizona Supreme Court, which used the doctrine of comity
to avoid the Tribe’s arguments under the inadequate representation exception as articulated by the Ninth Circuit.159 Thus, to say that the San
Carlos Apache Tribe was ignorant of the law would in effect place blame
on the Tribe for its failure to foresee the Arizona court’s use of the doctrine of comity to avoid its arguments that were grounded in federal
precedent.
But comity is a discretionary doctrine—courts are not required to
use the doctrine in any given situation.160 Thus, it is unrealistic to charge
the Tribe with ignorance of its legal rights because those rights depended
on the court’s discretion. The Tribe could not have been held responsible
for knowledge of how the court would exercise its discretion.161 Indeed,
the Arizona court did not even decide the most contested issue—the issue of inadequate representation.
Further, even if the Arizona court had not applied the doctrine of
comity, the “considerable disparity in federal Indian law has made . . .
judicial interpretation unpredictable.”162 The Supreme Court’s inexplicable failure at times to apply the Indian canons of construction is an ex-

158. See Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
159. Generally, under the doctrine of comity, a court may defer to and respect the law or disposition of another jurisdiction, or it may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case until the court of
the other jurisdiction has an opportunity to decide the matter. See, e.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.
269, 274 (2005).
160. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (“‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.”).
161. The only way that the tribe could have known that the state court would decline to decide
the issue based on comity is if the tribe first anticipated that the federal courts would decline to decide the tribe’s water rights and dismiss the tribe’s case, forcing the tribe into state court. But prior to
the 1983 Supreme Court case, tribes were permitted to bring water rights claims in federal court. The
Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision could hardly have been anticipated considering that the Court based
its decision on policy, not on the plain language of the McCarran amendment, which did not indicate
that federal courts could decline jurisdiction over tribes’ cases. Despite the plain language of the
statute, the Supreme Court determined that federal courts should decline jurisdiction over native
water rights claims. This faulty reasoning was compounded by the longstanding belief that state
courts could not be trusted to decide these claims because state courts were oftentimes hostile to
tribes due to historical differences between locals and the tribes. Thus, the tribe could not have
known that the case would be in state court. Therefore, the tribe could not have known that the court
would then use comity to decline to decide the inadequate representation exception but nevertheless
apply res judicata.
162. Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based Upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal
Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 354 (2003); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme
Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 580 (2008) (describing Federal Indian Law as “an
area of law that is often confusing, unpredictable, and prone to obfuscation”).
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ample of this lack of predictability. 163 Indeed, the Arizona court also
failed, without explanation, to apply the Indian canons of construction.
Tribes should not be held responsible for knowledge of an unpredictable
judicial interpretation prior to a court’s decision.
The San Carlos Apache Tribe case shows that the current rule,
which focuses solely on factual ambiguity, is detached from reality. The
rule does not account for the inherent unpredictability of the law, especially when the outcome of a case depends on a judge’s discretion. This
rigid approach might at first seem to be a necessary expedient that reduces litigation. However, holding parties accountable for knowledge of unpredictable legal outcomes will ultimately increase litigation. Under this
rule, tribes must bring their suits for breach of fiduciary duty before it is
apparent from a court’s determination that any harm occurred. Parties
would sue their lawyers or trustees just to prevent the loss of a claim in
case a future decision showed that the representation was inadequate.
Courts should therefore permit equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations when a tribe cannot fairly be held accountable for knowledge
of the law. A statute of limitations should be tolled when the fiduciary’s
liability turns on an issue of first impression, when the language of a
statute or decree is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, or when the case is decided under a discretionary doctrine.164 Although a tribe might fairly be held to have knowledge of the law when an
area of the law is settled, the complexity and unpredictability of federal
Indian law would oftentimes favor tolling the statute of limitations.
B. Developing a Unified Approach to Ambiguity and Applying Threshold
Canons of Construction
Central to the San Carlos Apache Tribe court’s determination was
its reliance on the supposedly unambiguous terms in the Globe Equity
Decree, which the court compared to the unambiguous terms in the Termination Act in Catawba. In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has sometimes found broad, all-encompassing terms such as those in the Decree to
be ambiguous. 165 The first subsection in this Part explores one case
where the Supreme Court found ambiguity in such a situation. It then
argues for courts to follow this approach in the interests of predictability
163. E.g., Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001).
164. Alternatively, a court could look to a party’s legal sophistication to determine whether the
party would have the ability to predict legal outcomes. Such an approach, however, penalizes parties
that do gain knowledge of the law and encourages ignorance of the law because ignorance would
help the party toll the statute of limitations.
165. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
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and for courts to determine that broad, all-encompassing terms are ambiguous as to whether they address specific, unmentioned, reserved
rights of tribes. The second subsection provides a framework for analyzing ambiguity not just in the limited instances of broad terms applying to
specific reserved rights, but in all cases of ambiguity. This latter subsection proposes several threshold canons of construction to analyze whether ambiguity is present such that regular canons of construction apply.
1. A Unified Approach to Ambiguity of Broad Terms
Mille Lacs Band provides one example of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
willingness to find broad terms ambiguous.166 In that case, a treaty between the Mille Lacs Tribe and the federal government provided that
“the said Indians do fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the United States, any and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the
same may be, which they may now have in, and to any other lands in the
Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere.”167 Although this broad language
appeared unequivocal, the Supreme Court nevertheless emphasized that
the treaty did not refer to hunting and fishing rights specifically.168 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the treaty did not abrogate the
Tribe’s rights to hunt or fish.169
The Court found ambiguity in the treaty’s plain language based on
the historical context of the treaty.170 The Court then applied the Indian
canons of construction: “Indian treaties are to be interpreted liberally in
favor of the Indians, and . . . any ambiguities are to be resolved in their
favor.”171 Further, the Court “interpret[s] Indian treaties to give effect to
the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood them.” 172
Although “Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, . . . it must clearly
express its intent to do so.”173 The Court provided a rationale for the canons: “the United States treaty drafters had the sophistication and experience to use express language for the abrogation of treaty rights.”174

166. See id.
167. Id. at 195.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 200.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 196.
173. Id. at 202; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] (Neil Jessup
Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012) (“[T]ribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless
Congress’s intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.” (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999))).
174. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 195.
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In contrast to the Mille Lacs court, the Catawba and San Carlos
courts were unwilling to find ambiguity despite the complex legal issues
that prevented certainty regarding the effect of the terms of the Termination Act and Globe Equity Decree. These disparate approaches create
unpredictability in the law and cannot be reconciled based on the nature
of the rights at issue. Had the hunting and fishing rights at issue in Mille
Lacs been more important than aboriginal water rights of San Carlos
Apache Tribe or rights to tribal land in Catawba, then one might argue
that Mille Lacs merely reduced the threshold for ambiguity for rights that
were deserving of greater protection. But the courts suggested no hierarchy of tribal rights. Indeed, the aboriginal rights and land rights in San
Carlos Apache Tribe and Catawba, respectively, are vital to tribes’ survival and sovereignty, just as much as fishing and hunting rights. If anything, water provides for a more basic need than hunting and, therefore,
should receive greater protection.
Without a hierarchy of protected rights, the cases cannot be reconciled. Either these broad, all-encompassing terms are ambiguous in their
application to specific protected rights of tribes, or they are unambiguous
in their plain meaning and encompass all rights of tribes including reserved or aboriginal rights. The more compelling approach is that of
Mille Lacs not only because it is the most recent Supreme Court case on
the matter.
The Mille Lacs Court’s approach of finding ambiguity in broad,
vague terms is more compelling for linguistic, intent-based reasons as
well. An author or speaker may use broad language even while assuming
that some topics are outside the scope of the discussion. The only way to
clarify the status of a speaker’s assumptions is for the speaker himself to
make them explicit. Thus, broad language should be considered ambiguous in its application to specific reserved rights. This effectively places
the burden to clarify such assumptions on the speaker, author, or drafter,
who is in the best position to clarify them. As the Mille Lacs court recognized, “the United States treaty drafters had the sophistication and experience to use express language for the abrogation of treaty rights.”175
In San Carlos Apache Tribe, recognition of the Decree’s ambiguity
would have likely allowed the Tribe to pursue its claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Because the effect of the Decree would not have been considered plain from its terms, the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling would
have been necessary to clarify the meaning of the Decree. Thus, the
Tribe would not have had notice of its claim and the Tribe’s claim for
175. Id.
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damages would not have accrued until the Arizona court’s decision in
2006.
Not only would a recognition of ambiguity have provided the Tribe
a remedy for the deprivation of its water rights, it would also have made
applicable the Indian canons of construction. These canons, in turn,
would have favored interpreting the ambiguous Decree so that it did not
cover the Tribe’s reserved water rights.176 Accordingly, the Tribe may
have been permitted to claim reserved water rights to the Gila River. A
finding of ambiguity could have very well prevented the deprivation of
the Tribe’s water rights in the first place.
2. Determining Ambiguity with Threshold Canons of Construction
San Carlos Apache Tribe and Mille Lacs specifically concern the
construction of broad, vague terms encompassing reserved rights, and
this narrow situation can be addressed with certainty and predictability
under the unified approach from Mille Lacs. But courts must determine
ambiguity in many other instances. A broader framework for determining
this ambiguity is necessary.
The current framework—applying canons of construction only after
a determination of ambiguity—needs reworking. Granted, through the
Indian canons of construction, courts have sometimes been willing to
view language from the perspective of tribes after a determination of
ambiguity has been made. But these canons become useless when they
are rendered inapplicable upon a finding that the controlling language is
unambiguous: “When a statute is clear on its face . . . the canons of construction will not come into play.”177 As shown in San Carlos Apache
Tribe, courts have been more than willing to deny ambiguity in the first
place, preventing application of the canons of construction to textual interpretation in Indian law cases. Thus, not only must courts be given
standards on how to interpret ambiguous language, they also must be
given standards with which they can determine ambiguity in the first
place: threshold canons of construction.
If, under the canons of construction described in Mille Lacs, ambiguous statutes should be interpreted as Indians would have interpreted
them, then why shouldn’t the determination of ambiguity itself be made
176. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
177. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
LexisNexis 2012) (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)); South Carolina v. Catawba
Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986) (“The canon of construction regarding the resolution of
ambiguities in favor of Indians, however, does not permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist;
nor does it permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of Congress.”).
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from the perspective of tribes as well? If ambiguities should be resolved
in favor of the tribes, then why should a close call regarding whether
ambiguity is present not also be resolved in favor of tribes? A formalist
would argue that ambiguity is an objective quality that can be determined
without reference to the perspective of the reader. But the differing results over similar language in Mille Lacs and San Carlos Apache Tribe
show that even courts will differ as to what is ambiguous. In other words,
ambiguity of language is itself ambiguous.
To determine whether language is ambiguous and whether the regular canons therefore apply, courts should use threshold canons of construction. The threshold canons of construction proposed below track
current Indian canons of construction as delineated in Mille Lacs and
other Supreme Court precedent. First, doubt regarding whether a provision is ambiguous should be resolved in the favor of tribes.178 Second,
treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders should be construed
liberally in favor of finding ambiguity when tribal reserved rights would
otherwise be diminished.179 Third, a doubtful determination on ambiguity
should be resolved such that “tribal property rights and sovereignty are
preserved” absent clear congressional intent. 180 Finally, courts should
initially view text from the perspective of tribes to determine whether
language is ambiguous.181
Because the distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous language is often elusive, as shown in the conflict between Mille Lacs, Catawba, and San Carlos Apache Tribe, a difference in perspective could
very well change a court’s decision on whether text is ambiguous. Indeed, applying any of these threshold canons could have made the difference in San Carlos Apache Tribe and could, in future cases, prevent the
deprivation of tribes’ federal reserved rights. Although it is too early to
178. This threshold canon is based on a canon found in a number of Supreme Court cases: Any
“doubtful expressions . . . should be resolved in favor of the [Indians].” E.g., McClanahan v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); see also sources cited at COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] n.3 (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012).
179. This second threshold canon is modeled on the Supreme Court’s statement that “treaties
should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions interpreted for their
benefit.” Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985); see also sources cited
at COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] n.2 (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
LexisNexis 2012).
180. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] n.5 (Neil Jessup Newton et al.
eds., LexisNexis 2012) (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172,
202 (1999)).
181. The final threshold canon is based on the Mille Lacs court’s statement, “We interpret
Indian treaties to give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood them.”
Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 196; see also sources cited at COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW § 2.02[1] n.5 (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012).
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say exactly how each of these threshold canons would function in a given
case, the starting point should be how the regular canons of construction
on which they are based would function. Thus, to determine how the
third and fourth canon should be interpreted, Mille Lacs is relevant precedent.182
VI. CONCLUSION
Over decades of litigation, the San Carlos Apache Tribe has seen its
rights adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Arizona Supreme
Court, and finally the Federal Circuit. Each of these courts left the Tribe
with fewer rights. They interpreted statutory language and the Globe Equity Decree against the Tribe, ultimately leaving the Tribe without a
remedy against the United States for diminishing its rights to water that
runs, or should run, through its reservation.
This Note has exposed the flaws in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning
in dismissing the Tribe’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against the United States. More importantly, it has offered three approaches for future
courts to take in reserved-rights cases: (1) considering both legal and factual ambiguity in determining whether a tribe is on notice of its claim
such that the statute of limitations begins to run; (2) finding ambiguity in
overarching language alleged to affect reserved rights consistent with the
Supreme Court’s approach in Mille Lacs Band; and (3) applying threshold canons of construction to determine when ambiguity is present in
Indian law cases. With these tools in hand, courts need not reach the unjust result of the San Carlos Apache Tribe line of cases. Instead, they can
interpret statutes in a way that protects tribes’ reserved rights while taking a realistic approach to the pervasive ambiguity of federal Indian law.

182. Relevant precedent also would include the sources cited at COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] nn.4–5 (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012).

